Trade is not a Human Right, it is merely a tool!

It would be a conceptual error to believe that the positive effects of trade could lead to the consecration of “trade” as a human right. Furthermore, on the contrary, crystallising “trade” as a human right could obstruct any positive effects.

Trade should only be understood as a tool that is at the service of the state’s obligation to guarantee human rights within its jurisdiction. This tool, to date, has been brutally ineffective: it has contributed to the destruction of the environment, through the occupation of lands, deforestation and the depletion of non-renewable resources, which will have an indirect impact on all people, but will have a direct and immediate impact that will target the least privileged communities (like people living in poverty and indigenous communities). It has caused the exploitation of labour of different social groups that constitute slave labour, who are responsible for producing goods, services and products at a much lower cost than the sale price. It has commercialised the human body (the clearest example of this can be seen in the sexual trade and exploitation of women and children). It has increased the gap between the wealthy and the poor. It has normalised tastes/preferences and certain areas of inclusion/exclusion based on criteria associated with classism, racism, xenophobia, heteronormativity and mysogeny.

Thus, the current debate should not be centred on whether we should consider “trade” to be a human right, but rather on whether it is possible to think about an idea of trade that does not violate human rights and allows for improvement in indices of satisfaction with rights, in a way which is comprehensive, interdependent and not limited exclusively to, for example, job creation. In this way, it is not through the consecration of “trade” as a human right that we could achieve a human and egalitarian approach at trade that could be universalised. On the contrary, the best path for this is the progressive analysis of the relationship between existing rights and the trade policies that are designed and implemented. In other words, the existing political human rights programme should be converted into limits that are increasingly clear and precise in trade policies. It is not human rights that should be subordinated to trade policy, but precisely the reverse.

The consequences of traditional forms of trade provide ample fodder for debate in the area of human rights. Therefore, we are morally obligated to first discuss how to resolve and repair all the human rights violations that are caused by the current form of regulating (or failing to regulate) trade in our states. Afterwards, long after, perhaps it will be useful to discuss whether to bless trade itself with the status of a human right.

To synthesise, if trade should be seen in any way, it is as a tool (among others that are available) to increase and improve egalitarian access to the exercise of basic rights. Within a political programme associated with the condemnation of injustice and inequality, trade has to operate as an instrument to prioritise achieving this goal above others (or, one could say, exclusively). It is not important to perceive trade as a human right, but rather to focus the discussion on whether any form of trade is compatible with human rights and, taking this point further, if any form of trade is a suitable tool – that could be proposed, designed, implemented and evaluated with objective parameters and in a given amount of time – in order to improve the situation of the worst placed social groups. This final point would also require the satisfaction of very basic criteria: the adequate participation of these groups in the decision making process and the control of trade, together with multiple and non-hegemonic ideas of trade, progress and development.

Considering trade itself to be a human right significantly reduces the possibility of a democratic debate regarding its reach, limits, advisability, the forms that it should adopt, the markets and products in which it should be conducted.

Precisely because rights are trump cards for this type of debate and because these debates are central and permanent in the area of trade, “trade” per se, taken simply or in general terms, should not be recognised as a right. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the consecration of trade as a human right would not improve the opportunities of the most underprivileged groups, but rather would provide more and better judicial tools and veto powers to those who administer economic power at both the local and international level (large multinational companies, economic groups, etc…), that are, at the same time, those who have the greatest capacity to utilise the judicial mechanisms ratified in the majority of our states in order to protect human rights. Returning to points (b) and (c) from the beginning of this article, the incorporation of the supposed right to trade would affect efforts made by a large part of academic streams of thought that seek to reduce the incidence and exaggerated protection of certain rights, such as private property or the freedom to enter into contracts and conduct business. At the same time, this would transfer the power of different business sectors to Human Rights Systems that, even with their shortcomings, have attempted to maintain a distance from them. It would invite powerful sectors to take advantage of judicial tools that have been created for the weakest sectors of society.

States have to keep their hands free from powerful sectors and tied to excluded sectors, in order to develop a different range of policies with the objective of guaranteeing human rights. In many cases, guaranteeing human rights will require betting on trade policies, correcting them, modifying them, transforming them, or even abolishing them.